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Since problems of ecofeminism are orientated not only towards contemporary times, but also towards future, this 
paper will examine the role of technique in an attempt of their resolving. Post-modern, lets call it fluid, 
understanding of the Being as plurality is given as an alternative to often criticized horizon of classical metaphysic 
(reduced on monistic or factual understanding of Being in a sense of something that is given, firm and/or 
unchangeable). Precisely that post-modern understanding is often appreciated as a solution of ecological and feminist 
issues. Does a unity of a man and the machine, the same unity which bare attempt has produced ecological and other 
problems that we are affronting, truly offer their solution or do the old conditions of domination over women and 
domination over nature transfer in the idea of transhuman beings? Is the world of information as the essence of a 
cultural (human) world a solution of a „problem‟ of natural or is it a path to a new, repetitive, slavery? As an effort of 
answering this and other questions, reasoning of the idea of transhumanism (Bostrom – Sloterdijk) in a feminist 
discourse (Haraway) will be related to epistemological understanding of technique (Heidegger, Gehlen). This 
appreciation will be comprehended as the finalization of a dominant „stiff‟ metaphysical understanding of nature (as 
something that can be realized). 
Key words: Donna Haraway, ontology, cyborg, transhumanism, technology. 
 
Prevladavanje ili savladavanje ekofeminizma? U ovom će se radu, imajući na umu budućnosno orijentirane 
probleme ekofeminizma, preispitati uloga tehnike u njihovom mogućem rješavanju. Naime, kritiziranom se obzorju 
klasične metafizike (ograničenom na monističko ili faktično shvaćanje bitka u smislu onoga što je dano, čvrsto i/ili 
nepromjenjivo) kao alternativa (što već u sebi podrazumijeva određeni dualizam) nameće postmoderno, nazovimo ga 
fluidnim, shvaćanje sebstva kao mnoštva. Upravo se takvo postmoderno shvaćanje često razumijeva kao svojevrsno 
rješenje i ekološke i feminističke problematike. Nudi li sjedinjenje čovjeka i stroja, ono isto sjedinjenje čiji je 
pokušaj proizveo ekološke i ine probleme s kojima se sada suočavamo, uistinu njihovo rješenje ili se pak stari odnosi 
dominacije nad ženom i dominacije nad prirodom preslikavaju i u ideju transhumanih bića? Je li svijet informacija 
kao suština kulturnog (čovječjeg) svijeta rješenje „problema‟ prirodnog ili put u novo, perpetuirajuće, ropstvo? Kako 
bi se pokušao dati odgovor na ova i ostala postavljena pitanja, promišljanje će se ideje transhumanizma (na liniji 
Bostrom – Sloterdijk) u feminističkom diskursu (Haraway) dovesti u vezu s epistemološkim tumačenjem tehnike 
(Heidegger, Gehlen) kao krajnjim provođenjem dominantnog „tvrdog‟ metafizičkog razumijevanja svijeta, odnosno 
prirode (kao onog spoznatljivog). 
Ključne riječi: Donna Haraway, ontologija, kiborg, transhumanizam, tehnika. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION. HARAWAY AND 
ECOFEMINISM 
 
At the beginning of this paper it 
should probably be noticed that Donna 
Haraway‟s A Cyborg Manifesto, which will 
later be critically acclaimed, thematically 
does not fall under the area of ecofeminism 
in the strict sense. If we accept the thesis that 
by feminism we actually consider certain    
M. Selak Overcoming or Suppressing Ecofeminism? 
 
The Holistic Approach to Environment 1(2011)4, 143-152 Page 144 
 
“-isms”, it is important to emphasise that this 
work is, as the author herself states, a 
contribution to socialist-feminist culture and 
theory in a postmodernist non-naturalistic 
way. Nevertheless, having in mind that 
ecology itself is a theoretical product of 
ambivalent unity of human and machine, the 
questioning of the role of technology, 
especially its realisation through modern 
technological advances precisely appears 
essential in considering ecofeminist issues. 
Hence, this Haraway‟s work, in which she 
analyses human-machine unification from a 
feminist perspective, can serve as a solid 
ground for a future-oriented consideration of 
the woman–technology–nature relationship, 
i.e. for a possible outline of ecofeminism of 
tomorrow.  
Although her work does not fall 
under ecofeminism, as we have already 
stated, in her panegyric to cyborghood 
Haraway does not miss to define and „place‟ 
ecofeminism, which will also be addressed 
in this introduction. 
One of the premises of her work is 
that the majority of American socialists and 
feminists see the connection between mind–
body, animal–machine or idealism–
materialism dualisms in social practices, 
symbolic formulations and physical 
artefacts, and high-tech and scientific culture 
[1: 154]. They have been insisting, according 
to Haraway, on the domination of 
technology and inviting us in an imaginary 
organic body that should integrate our 
resistance. Furthermore, Haraway argues 
that the American radical feminists, such as 
Susan Griffin, Audre Lord and Adrienne 
Rich, have deeply influenced our political 
imaginations – and perhaps excessively 
restricted our notion of friendly body and 
political language. They insist on the organic 
by putting it in opposition to the 
technological. But their symbolic systems, 
together with similar positions of 
ecofeminism and feminist paganism also 
permeated with organicism, can be regarded 
only as Sandoval‟s oppositional ideologies 
that become the late 20
th
 century, as 
Haraway thinks. They will simply confuse 
those who are not preoccupied with 
machines and consciousness of the late 
capitalism [1: 174]. However, Haraway 
believes that feminists could gain 
significantly by explicitly using the 
possibilities inherent to the break of 
organism–machine and similar distinctions 
which constitute the Western selfhood. 
Hence her cyborg metaphors express two 
key assertions in the mentioned essay: 1) 
universal, totalizing theories are wrong and 
fail to give an account of the reality; 2) to 
take responsibility for social, scientific and 
technological relations means to reject 
antiscientific metaphysics and demonisation 
of technology, thus taking the professional 
task of reconstructing the boundaries of 
everyday life, in partial connection with 
others, in communication with all its parts 
[1: 181]. In accordance to this, Haraway 
regards biology as a convenient „scientific‟ 
method and calls it “the queen of 
cryptography” [1: 164]. 
This oversimplification of 
ecofeminist critical appraisal of utilisation of 
technology, which Haraway superficially 
characterises as the one comprised solely of 
organic, religious, or at least metaphysical 
arguments, and which reduces ecofeminism 
to essentialism and spiritualism, is partial, to 
say the least, and therefore incorrect. The 
truth is much more devastating. This paper 
will try to show that we actually do not need 
any „organic‟ or „saintly‟ arguments in order 
to criticise the cyborg‟s promise of a brighter 
future. The contradiction of its very 
promoters, together with not especially deep 
reflection of the current state of social 
relations, careful consideration of 
ontological background and presenting the 
mentioned are by itself sufficient for at least 
a concern for the future of the Other. The 
concern indeed hides in the possibility of its 
total submission which could happen if 
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ecofeminism does not undertake serious 
critique of technology, but yields itself to the 
idea of scientific-technological progress, 
under the false pretence of final liberation 
from all forms of domination, which we will 




CYBORG AS A TRANSHUMAN 
(POSTMODERN) BEING (HARAWAY – 
BOSTROM – SLOTERDIJK). THE 
THEORETICAL CONTEXT 
 
There are several possibilities for 
accomplishing the idea of overstepping the 
man in the biological sense. The most 
controversial and the prevailing ones are 
including the implementation of technology. 
It is considered that precisely with the use of 
technology it will be possible to overcome 
human biological limitations. As one of the 
most prominent supporters of this idea we 
can emphasise so called transhumanists. 
“Transhumanism is a way of thinking 
about the future that is based on the premise 
that the human species in its current form 
does not represent the end of our 
development but rather a comparatively 
early phase. We formally define it as 
follows: 
1) The intelectual and cultural movement 
that affirms the possibility and desirability of 
fundamentally improving the human 
condition through applied reason, especially 
by developing and making widely available 
technologies to eliminate aging and to 
greatly enhance human intellectual, physical, 
and psychological capacities. 
2) The study of the ramifications, promises, 
and potential dangers of technologies that 
will enable us to overcome fundamental 
human limitations, and the related study of 
the ethical matters involved in developing 
and using such technologies.” [2: 4] 
This brief introduction to the ideas of 
transhumanist movement was necessary in 
order for us to find the philosophical and/or 
ideological matrix under which Haraway‟s 
idea of cyborg falls. In this sense, cyborg 
could be represented as a posthuman being, 
while Donna Haraway could be 
characterised as a feminist transhumanist 
thinker. She understands the notion of 
cyborg as a machine–organism hybrid, a 
creation of social reality and fiction. 
Haraway praises cyborg as a fiction which 
outlines our social and bodily reality and as a 
means of imagination which suggests some 
very fruitful conjunctions. According to her, 
cyborgs are not only our future – by the end 
of the 20
th
 century we are all hybrids of 
machines and organism, we are all cyborgs, 
cyborg is our ontology, it creates politics. 
Through the idea of cyborg Haraway 
advocates satisfaction with the confusion of 
boundaries, and responsibility in their 
creation, while imagining a world without 
gender, a world which perhaps lacks a 
beginning, but also an end [1: 150]. Cyborg 
thus represents a creature in the post-gender 
world, a supreme selfhood finally 
emancipated of all its dependencies, 
moreover, it skips the phase of original 
unity, of identification with nature in the 
Western sense – from which, as Hillary 
Klein argues, differences must be created 
and included in the drama of escalating 
domination over woman as well as nature.  
Three ruptures in the boundary are 
crucial for this political-fictional analysis to 
be possible: 
- the boundary between human and animal is 
broken – the strongholds of separation are 
turned into amusement parks, e.g. language; 
- the distinction between human/animal 
organism and machine, natural and artificial, 
mind and body, self-developing and 
externally designed is blurred; 
- the distinction between physical and non-
physical is imprecise.  
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The cyborg is decisively loyal to 
partiality, irony, intimacy and perversion, 
nature and culture are re-conceived, they 
cannot mutually incorporate or adopt each 
other any longer. In fact, as Haraway 
continues, postmodern strategies such as the 
cyborg myth corrupt a multitude of organic 
wholes – the certainty of what is considered 
as nature; transcendent authorisation of 
interpretation is lost together with 
ontological foundations of Western 
epistemology [1: 151–153]. Similarly, Peter 
Sloterdijk considers the anti-technological 
hysteria, which has affected large parts of 
the Western world, a product of the decay of 
metaphysics, because it adheres to wrong 
divisions of being in order to counter the 
processes by which these same divisions 
have been overcome. It is the case of 
bivalence which refers to a poorly 
understood polyvalence [3: 929–941]. 
As a way to explicate places in this 
messianic deliverance from the dark slavery 
of human kind towards the promised land of 
cyborgs that lack soundness, we will 
compare Haraway‟s eulogy to the cyborg 
with the populist rhetoric of transhumanist 
movement members. For the illustration, we 
will use two quotes from the works of Nick 
Bostrom, Director of Future of Humanity 
Institute at the Oxford University.  
 “Why I Want to be a Posthuman When I 
Grow Up”: 
“Let us suppose that you were to develop 
into a being that has posthuman healthspan 
and posthuman cognitive and emotional 
capacities. At the early steps of this process, 
you enjoy your enhanced capacities. You 
cherish your improved health: you feel 
stronger, more energetic, and more balanced. 
Your skin looks younger and is more 
elastic... You also discover a greater clarity 
of mind. You can concentrate on difficult 
material more easily and it begins making 
sense to you... When you listen to music you 
perceive layers of structure and a kind of 
musical logic to which you were previously 
oblivious; this gives you great joy. You 
continue to find the gossip magazines you 
used to read amusing, albeit in a different 
way than before; but you discover that you 
can get more out of reading Proust and 
Nature. You begin to treasure almost every 
moment of life... You have just celebrated 
your 170th birthday and you feel stronger 
than ever. Each day is a joy.” [4: 5] 
“Letter from Utopia” (it is an 
imaginary letter of a posthuman to human): 
“Dear Human, Greetings, and may this letter 
find you at peace and in prosperity! Forgive 
my writing to you out of the blue. Though 
you and I have never met, we are not 
strangers. We are, in a certain sense, the 
closest of kin. I am one of your possible 
futures. 
I hope you will become me... and 
further he continues:  
What is Suffering in Utopia? Suffering is the 
salt trace left on the cheeks of those who 
were around before. 
What is Tragedy in Utopia? There is tragedy 
in Snowman‟s melting. Mass murders are 
not required. 
What is Guilt in Utopia? Guilt is our 
knowledge that we could have created 
Utopia sooner. 
We love life here every instant. 
Every second is so good that it would blow 
our minds had their amperage not been 
previously increased. My contemporaries 
and I bear witness, and we request your aid. 
Please, help us come into existence! Please, 
join us! Whether this tremendous possibility 
becomes reality depends on your actions. If 
your empathy can perceive at least the 
outlines of the vision I am describing, then 
your ingenuity will find a way to make it 
real.  
Human life, at its best, is fantastic. 
I‟m asking you to create something even 
greater. Life that is truly humane.  
Yours sincerely,  
Your Possible Future Self” [5: 1–7] 
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Although this perhaps already sounds 
as science fiction or utopia, thus being easier 
to reject as frivolous or to criticise its 
foundations from a scientific aspect, 
Haraway‟s rhetoric is essentially the same, 
only and insofar it is much more dangerous, 
because as such is much less 
transparent in the feminist discourse. 
Figuratively speaking, Haraway is touching 
us, „the dominated, the excluded, the 
different‟, where it hurts us most, while we 
rush, blinded by the excruciating pain, 
towards her salutary technological deus ex 
machina solution. 
 
THE FIRST WEAK POINT OF 
HARAWAY’S IDEA OF CYBORG. THE 
EULOGY TO THE SEMI-PRODUCT – 
IGNORING THE EXISTENCE OF THE 
FINAL PRODUCT 
 
What does Haraway really offer us? 
She speaks about blurring the differences as 
a possibility of a more humane, „inclusive‟ 
society. For instance, human babies with 
baboon hearts are confusing the nation, 
points out Haraway as an illustration in 
favour of her thesis. Sounds promising. 
Naturally, following this logic we are prone 
to think, if these as well as corresponding 
intersexual, interspecies and other 
combinations will exist, that any kind of 
exclusive society on any level will not be 
possible, which is exactly what feminism is 
fighting for in its broadest and most positive  
 
sense. Nevertheless, it is illusory to think 
that something like this will happen. That is, 
if it happens, then it will exist only as an 
intermediary stage, insufficient for itself to 
affirm the use of technology as the means to 
change/enhance humans. A reflective 
stopping at this „interstage‟ is analogous to 
drawing conclusions on e.g. height of 15-
year-olds in their developing phase of 
highest growth rate. What can be considered 
as a momentary union, the hybrid of 
everything which is the subject of Haraway‟s 
imagination, tells us nothing on what could 
we expect as the final product. Of course, 
what the final product will be we cannot 
know for certain, but we can try to anticipate 
it in two ways: by observing the present „us‟ 
and trying to answer the question of what we 
think technology is, so we can be aware of 
the outcomes of its (mis)use. 
 
THE SECOND WEAK POINT OF 
HARAWAY’S IDEA OF CYBORG. 
WHAT KIND OF FUTURE CAN WE 
CREATE HAVING IN MIND OUR 
PRESENT STATE? WHAT DO OUR 
DESIRES FOR BIOLOGICAL 
ENHANCEMENT SAY ABOUT OUR 
UNDERSTANDING OF THE 
BIOLOGICALLY ‘IMPERFECT’? 
 
The battle between the so-called 
transhumanists and the so-called 
bioconservatives takes place at several 
levels. Who the transhumanists are we have 
already explained, and for the 
bioconservatives, we can briefly say that 
they, as the name itself states, oppose the 
idea of human enhancement through 
technology. This debate most often boils 
down to the issues of human dignity idea 
(the debate between Fukuyama and 
Bostrom) and the possibility of individual 
moral choice (Habermas‟ critique). Bostrom 
promotes the idea of human dignity, arguing 
that it should expand the range of relevance 
by including post-human beings as well [6: 
202–214]. What is disturbing for the 
bioconservatives is the possibility that the 
existence of perfect beings can contribute to 
the loss of certain groups‟ moral status, e.g. 
children with special needs. These fears can 
actually find justification in the very fact of 
underlining the need for human biological 
enhancement/change, which not only 
recognises, but also emphasises biological 
imperfections, such as disabled people. 
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Following these arguments, if an average, 
healthy human should be enhanced, then 
what must someone with „natural‟ 
disadvantages do? What does this tell us 
about our sincere understanding of the 
„different‟? 
Let us make our point even stronger. 
Having in mind that the contemporary 
human creates this kind of future society 
with the final purpose of „biological 
perfection‟ (Haraway is focused only on this 
intermediate stage), why should we think 
that anyone in this „ideal‟ world, where 
everyone have the possibility to be flawless, 
would want (by that time it will really be a 
matter of will, maybe not our own, but the 
will of our parent creators) to be an 
imperfect experiment (such as those which 
are subjected to exploitation in the current 
society): homosexual, woman, or even 
„worse‟ – non-Caucasian woman, which is, 
in Haraway‟s terms, already a cyborg of the 
real life? If we accept Fukuyama‟s thesis in 
which he quotes Aristotle‟s understanding of 
human as a cultural being which learns from 
experience and transfers its heritage in a 
non-biological fashion, for it is precisely the 
humanity‟s constant efforts on its own 
cultural change what drives the history of 
mankind and causes growth and progress in 
complexity and refinement of human 
institutions over time, why should we 
believe that we will make progress in the 
issue of social exclusion through biological 
progress [7: 24]. Bearing in mind the need 
for biological improvement and, in this 
sense, obviously hypocritical equalisation of 
special needs individuals‟ rights, we will 
probably only underline it.  
 
THE THIRD WEAK POINT OF 
HARAWAY’S IDEA OF CYBORG. WHY 
DOES TECHNOLOGICAL 
IMPROVEMENT HIDE COMPLETION IN 




In her work Haraway only briefly 
reflects on the notion of technology, 
although if we want to talk about its 
possibilities and mechanical objectifications, 
it is perhaps necessary to provide at least a 
preliminary answer to this issue. 
Nevertheless, we could say that Haraway 
understands technology through its 
epistemological value. Thus, for example, 
she states that communication sciences and 
modern biologies are constructed in the same 
manner – by transforming the world into an 
encoding problem, with the search for a 
common language that vanquishes all 
resistance to instrumentalised control and 
enables dispersion, re-collection, supplying 
and exchange of all heterogeneity. In 
modern biologies the transformation of the 
world into an encoding problem can be 
illustrated by molecular genetics, ecology, 
sociobiological theory of evolution and 
immunobiology [1:164]. What does 
„epistemological‟ mean? Haraway here 
speaks on the transformation of the world. In 
epistemological terms, we can say that 
Haraway understands technology as a means 
by which human translates nature to a 
comprehensible language. In this sense, 
technology has a cognitive value. For 
Haraway, this cognitive value is 
anthropological, in terms of knowledge of 
humans, and knowledge (of nature) for 
humans. The machine is not something that 
should be animated, worshiped, by which we 
should dominate, says Haraway – we are the 
machine, our processes, the aspect of our 
embodiment [1: 180].  
The understanding of technology 
through its cognitive value can be considered 
in two ways: ontological (the knowledge of 
being) and epistemological (self-
knowledge). The first path is the knowledge 
of being, where truth is revealed by 
technology. An example of this is 
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Heidegger‟s ontological reflection of 
technology. Namely, Heidegger considers 
the instrumental and anthropological 
designation of technology (it is a means to 
an end and a human achievement) 
insufficient. It is correct, but it does not 
reveal the essence – it is not true. Through 
Aristotle‟s teachings on the four causes, 
Heidegger arrives to the notion of 
releasement (Gelassenheit):   
“Every occasion for whatever passes 
beyond the nonpresent and goes forward into 
presencing is poiesis, bringing-forth (Her-
vor-bringen).”  
Bringing-forth brings out something 
from the concealed into the unconcealed. 
The unconcealed is acquired through 
revealing, for which the Greek term is 
aletheia. We understand it as truth. 
Therefore, technology is not only a means, it 
is a way of revealing. Technology resides in 
the area of truth [8: 226]. 
The second – epistemological – 
belongs to the philosophy of Arnold Gehlen. 
“If by technology we refer to abilities and 
means by which human places nature under 
his service through comprehending its 
properties and laws, utilises them and uses 
against each other, then technology, in the 
most general sense, belongs to the human 
essence.” [9: 8] 
“The fascination with automatism 
makes the pre-rational and supra-practical 
drive in technology, which has in the course 
of many millennia acted, first of all, in 
magic, the technology of the supra-sensory, 
and only in most recent times it has found its 
outright completion in clocks, motors and 
rotating machines.” [9: 18] 
Gehlen calls this the phenomenon of 
resonance. In fact, since he is burdened with 
the mystery of its own existence, the human 
is referred to the compensation of its self-
understanding with the help of a non-I, 
something different-than-human.  
Gehlen argues that the human being 
in central parts of its nature is an automatism 
(e.g. heartbeat or breathing), hence the 
motivation for objectification of work 
originates from our nature. This motivation 
comes from the unconscious, 
unintentionally. Therefore, the nature, 
according to Gehlen, is the means by which 
the human comes out of himself and re-
establishes his self-understanding from it [9: 
17–18]. 
Therefore, in the first, Heidegger‟s 
interpretation, the human participates with 
the help of technology in revealing the truth, 
i.e. unconcealing being, while in the second, 
Gehlen‟s reflection, we know/translate 
ourselves, and the epistemological value lies 
in the self-revealing (or revealing of our own 
nature). 
Now, when we have at least tried to 
outline the answer to the question of what 
technology is, it is necessary to answer 
where the danger of this approach to 
technology hides, and in what way it relates 
to our ecofeminist story. 
Whether we deal with the human or 
nature, the epistemological approach, such 
as Haraway‟s, starts from an obvious 
presumption. For something to be known, it 
must be penetrable. For it to be penetrable, it 
must be knowable. Knowable in the subject-
object relation is always the one that is 
subjected, i.e. that is dominated. For 
something to be knowable, it must be given, 
i.e. fixed. What does this mean? It means 
that the domination of science and scientific 
(i.e. natural-scientific) methods lies on the 
assumption of knowable. Ontologically 
speaking, we start from the idea of a firm 
factual being. However, in the contemporary 
scientific-technological era, in which „the 
human lags behind his works‟, technology 
also carries an inherent danger. Why? 
Because today technology represents the 
attempt to objectify possibilities, to reify 
freedom, without taking responsibility, but, 
as Heidegger states, with the challenging 
which regards nature as a source of energy 
delivery, where the man himself walks on 
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the edge of a cliff, where he finally has to be 
regarded as a standing-reserve (by standing-
reserve (Bestand) Heidegger understands 
that which stands in a certain place only to 
be ready for deploying to another outpost [8: 
231]), that is, nature, and eventually the 
human, do not have purpose in themselves, 
but are educed to mere means as a part of 
purposes for something else. Unaware of her 
own objectification of nature, Haraway 
believes she does exactly the opposite, that 
she abolishes the current facticised, 
objectified being with the postmodern fluid 
concept of selfhood embodied in the idea of 
cyborg. However, have we thus really lost 
the ontology of foundations of Western 
epistemology, or it, on the contrary, reaches 
its peak? 
Throughout history, perhaps 
precisely because of the attempt of human 
factisation by defining what s/he is, it always 
came to the exclusion of the Others, which 
did not belong in that moment under this 
privileged definition. The most obvious 
examples are the rights of women, non-
Caucasian, generally colonised, and 
extended to other living beings. This is 
ontologically explicated as an attempt of a 
monist unifying understanding, as the 
domination of the firm factual being, the 
Western logos, which is opposed by the 
postmodern concept of dispersed fluid 
identity open to interpretation.  
If we consider that the justification of 
the postmodern interpretation, alternative to 
the modern exclusivity, lies precisely in the 
firmness and exclusivity of the historical 
logocentricity which has triumphed in the 
modern dualistic understanding, we will 
realise certain circularity. Namely, if 
something unique to all people does not 
exist, let us use Fukuyama‟s term Factor X 
[7: 188–190] which he explains with the 
elusive term of human dignity, if there does 
not exist something which makes us all 
equal, and from which the postmodern 
understanding defends itself vigorously, we 
would not be able to regard exclusion as 
unacceptable at all. That is, we could not 
fight against it. This means that the 
postmodern partiality its implicit 
justification and/or argumentation draws 
from the modern idea of the unity of human 
nature. Haraway fails to notice this when she 
argues that theoretical (postmodernism) and 
practical (technological) fight against the 
unity-by-domination and unity-by-
incorporation not only attacks patriarchy, 
colonialism, humanism, positivism, 
essentialism, scientism and other „-isms‟, but 
ironically also all other organic or natural 
standpoints. [1: 157] 
 
 
FINAL REMARK. THE DESTRUCTIVE 
BACKGROUND OF THE 
POSTMODERN IDEA OF NON-
GENDER 
 
After this attempt to consider 
technology, we can conclude that the idea of 
cyborg is not a real manifestation of the 
postmodern fluid being, but it is the case of 
finalisation of the old paradigm that regards 
nature as knowable, where finally through 
the cyborg (which will tomorrow be, as are 
women and nature of today, the one who is 
dominated) we arrive to „god‟ (i.e. the 
embodiment of a perfect human, or if we 
have an entire population in mind, the 
attempt to embody sameness, and not 
equality). Therefore we cannot help but 
wonder whether the existence of postmodern 
non-subject, i.e. dispersed selfhoods is even 
possible [10: 771–780], or it seems to be the 
case of the same monist being which is only 
being broken into pieces through this 
understanding – not to confirm plurality as 
the field of new possibilities, but only so it 
can simply be completely comprehended. In 
the same vein, we can notice that 
postmodern partial subjects are perfectly 
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adapted for the comprehension by modern 
monoperspectivist specialised natural 
sciences. Is the implementation of 
comprehensibility precisely what led to 
partialisation of our identities, theoretically 
embodied in the postmodern understanding 
of being, by which this, as Haraway terms it, 
„non-naturalistic‟ way is in fact self-
subjugation of science, and not the thing 
which will lead after the deconstruction of 
monist understanding, as her discourse is 
trying to justify, to a more pluralist inclusive 
society? What this paper tries to present as 
an ontological concern, expressed in all 
these questions, can be briefly summed up 
into one question: is, in fact, the only 
surprise, that the idea of non-gender hides, 
the destruction of any possible genus, i.e. 
overall existence? 
Because, what is actually a cyborg: 
“People are nowhere near so fluid, 
being both material and opaque. Cyborgs are 
ether, quintessence.” [1: 153] 
Although Haraway falls into 
contradiction – because further on in her text 
she denies faith in the essential unity since 
there is nothing in being a woman, there is 
nothing that unites women, so gender, class 
or race cannot be the grounds of belief in the 
essential unity – although she speaks of the 
destruction of ontology, the only thing she 
gives in return is a cyborg ontology. In fact, 
as we have already said, it is the case of a 
most ordinary ontological determinism 
which implies that nature, whether human or 
non-human, is something comprehensible, 
fixed and given.  
Finally, we will once again open the 
questions outlined in the summary: does the 
human–machine unification, the same 
unification the attempt of which caused 
ecological and similar issues that we now 
have to face, really offer a solution to these 
issues, or, on the other hand, are the old 
relations of domination over women or 
nature simply transferred in the idea of 
transhuman beings? Is the world of 
information as the essence of cultural 
(human) world a solution to nature‟s 
„issues‟, or a path towards a new, 
perpetuated slavery? 
To these questions we could add 
another, in the light of the „new ontological 
concern‟, which is often neglected due to its 
obviousness. If ecology is taking care of the 
consequences of domination over nature, and 
recently is trying to anticipate them, 
feminism likewise reveals the domination 
over woman, who does take care of the 
protection from self-subjugation of human 
nature? Who is responsible for the 
consequences of human domination over its 
own nature? Can ecofeminism in this sense 
serve as a barrier against the execution of 
this option? Instead of the answer, an even 
more important question imposes itself: what 
happens when the privileged positioned  
Other, i.e. the dominated in the 
dualistic understanding (we say „privileged‟ 
because only out of the sensitivity of these 
position could have arisen a true ecofeminist 
critique), takes over the dominating rhetoric, 
as well as the logic of the former, and thus 
falls under it. Donna Haraway gave this 
subtitle to her work: An Ironic Dream of a 
Common Language for Women in the 
Integrated Circuit. Accordingly, the question 
could be reversed. Is the feminist 
glorification of cyborgs – as we have tried to 
show, not the third way, but a sideway where 
the dominated obediently takes over and 
implements the dominator‟s ideas, thus 
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